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The exemption has come at a price. First, the parties made various concessions including a
commitment to submitreports of contract activity so that theCommission canbe assured that there
is competition on the market. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the Commission has
indicated that it will review the g`enerous' regime embodied in Regulation 4056/86.The Commission
announced a fundamental review of the regime and itmay well be that the long-standing perception
that the Commission does not like the Council-imposedblockexemption in Regulation 4056/86may
result in the block exemption being narrowed or even eliminated.
The exemption has only limited precedential value. It comes in the context of the very competitive
conditions on the transatlantic liner shipping market. Nonetheless, it is an important development,
but thebigger game ^ thereviewof the rules in their entirety ^ is farmore dramatic for the industry
as awhole.
Shipbuilding gets a poormid-termreport
The European Commission adopted a report on13 November 2002 tracing the developments in EC
shipbuilding during the firsthalf of 2002.Thiswas the Sixth Shipbuilding Report.Orders for new ships
internationally were downby almost two-thirds over the correspondingperiod in 2000 butorders in
the EC were down by four-fifths in the same period. The EC sees the serious decline in the EC as
symptomatic of the subsidies being offered outside the EC and therefore the EC has taken its case
to theWorld Trade Organisation.
EU LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
Jason Chuah
GEHA Naftiliaki EPE and Others v NPDD Limeniko Tamio Dodekanisou
Case C-435/00, ECJ, 14 November 2002
Harbour dues and the freedomto provide services
This is yet another case involving the operation of Regulation 4055/86 which applies the principle of
freedom to provide services to maritime transport between Member States and between Member
States and third countries (OJ 1986 L378/1).The present case was the result of an application for a
preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice by the Trimeles Diikitiko Protodikio Rodou
(Administrative Court of First Instance, Rhodes).
The factual background
The dispute arose from the imposition of certain harbour charges on shipowners and ship operators
offering excursions to tourists in Rhodes.Under the relevant Greek law (Law No 2399/1996), ships
sailing from a Greek port on international voyagesmust pay:
(a) a fixed charge of GRD 5,000 for ships sailing to an international destination (other than the EU,
Cyprus, Albania, Russia,Ukraine,Moldova and Georgia);
(b) a fixed charge of GRD 500 for each passenger with a final destination in a country of the EU or
Cyprus;
(c) a fixed charge of GRD1,000 for each passenger with a final destination of any port in Albania,
Russia,Moldova, the Ukraine or Georgia on the Black Sea; and,
(d) a fixed charge of GRD 2,000 for each passenger with a final destination of any overseas port,
while tourist ships are required to pay fixed dues of GRD 50 for each passenger taking a day trip
between Greek ports, for every port at which the vessel calls.The law further provides that where
the day trip is extended to a foreign port, the dues shall be calculated according to (a) to (d) above.
The defendants in the present case offered day excursions toTurkey for tourists staying in Rhodes.
Under the Greek law, they were charged the flat fee of GRD 5,000.They argued that as the ships
always returned to Rhodes, they should be charged the lower rate of GRD 50.
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The law
Article1of Regulation 4055/86 provides:
(1) Freedom to provide maritime transport services between Member States and between Member
States and third countries shall apply in respect of nationals of Member States who are established
in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.
(4) For the purposes of this Regulation, the following shall be considered as maritime transport
services between Member States and between Member States and third countries where they are
normally provided for remuneration:
(a) intra-Community shipping services: the carriage of passengers or goods by sea between any
port of a Member State and any part or off-shore installation of another Member State;
(b) third-country traffic: the carriage of passengers or goods by sea between the ports of a
Member State and ports or off-shore installations of a third country.
The issues
The Greek law in question was challenged on several grounds. First, that it was unlawful because it
discriminated against maritime transport services to third countries.This is a novel and important
issue. In the past, it has been established that the Regulation protected carriers from other Member
States from being discriminated against by a Member State (Case C-381/93 Commission v France
[1994] ECR I-5145) but the extent to which the Regulation guaranteed the freedom of maritime
services between Member States and third countries has never been considered.
Secondly, the Greek law imposes different (higher) levels of harbour dues for passengers of vessels
which call at, or have as a final destination, a port in a non-EUcountry.The issue is complicatedby the
fact that, as was pointed out by the Greek Harbour Fund, those higher dues were imposed on all
passengers regardless of their nationality.On the other hand, could it be argued that, as the higher
harbour dues would have an effect on the choice of routes to be taken by vessel operators and
owners, their impositionwould be contrary to Regulation 4055/86?
Finally, as harbour dues for non-EUdestinations are also differentiated according to the distance and
geographical location of the relevant final destination port, the issue arises as to whether such
differentiation constitutes discrimination as regardsmaritime transport to a particular third country
(or particular third countries) and therefore a restriction on maritime transport provided to that
country (or those countries).
Construing Regulation 4055/86
A particular point of interest is how Regulation 4055/86, an instrument which has its genesis in the
concept of EU freemovement of services in Articles 49 to 51EC, should be construed in relation to
non-EUinterests.UnderArticle 51(1) EC, freedom toprovide services in the field of transport, unlike
freedom of services in other fields of economic and commercial activity, is not only to be applied in
accordancewith thegeneralrules inArticles 49 and 50 butmustbe applied subject toTitleV (Articles
70 to 80) onTransport Policy.TitleVmakes provision for the liberalisation of international maritime
transport between Member States (intra-Community transport) and Member States and third
countries. Article 71states quite explicitly that:
taking into account the distinctive features of transport, the Council, shall . . . lay down:
(a) common rules applicable to international transport to or from the territory of a Member State or
passing across the territory of one ormore Member States;
(b) the conditions under which non-resident carriersmayoperate transport serviceswithin aMember
State;
(c) measures to improve transport safety;
(d) any other appropriate provisions.
It is in this context that Regulation 4055/86 was made. The implication is thus that the rules in
Regulation 4055/86 should be construed, teleologically, against two backdrops: the jurisprudence
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on freemovement of services and the EU transport policy formaritime transport.Freemovement
of services principles do not conventionally and normally apply to non-EU interests as the ECJ
found that Regulation 4055/86 had in fact extended these rights to non-EU interests. The Court
said:
Since Article1(1) of Regulation 4055/86 has extended the principle of the freedom to provide services
as regards intra-Community traffic to traffic between a Member State and a third country, the rules
established in relation to the formermust be applied to the latter.
The Greek Authorities' argument that the harbour dues were fair because they did not discriminate
on the ground of nationality was not relevant, given that the Regulation had extended the benefits of
freemovement of services to third-country carriers and users (passengers and cargo interests).This
is welcome to the extent that it would clearly contribute to the Community's desire for full
liberalisation of internationalmaritime transport.
What does `restriction on freemovement'mean?
The central questionwas whether the harbour dues could impede the freemovement of services in
the context of the Regulation. Although the court did not expressly consider the question, simply
deeming that it did, using tests established elsewhere, it is clearly conceivable that as the dues were
many times higher in journeys to third countries than to domestic (and EU) destinations, they are
liable to dissuade travellers (users of service) from taking part in a trip to a non-EUcountry and thus
render the provision of that service less attractive than comparable services provided only within
Greece.
It was also asked in the proceedings whether there would be a manifest difference if the harbour
dues were absorbed by the shipping companies or operators and were not exacted and invoiced
separately against the passenger.The argument was that if it were the shipping companies paying
the dues, then it could not be held that the passenger would feel aggrieved and not travel to
destinations in Turkey. Again, the court did not address the question directly (although the
Advocate General did discuss it). It might be said that the contention does not carry much weight
because, in either case, the dueswould still constitute a factor whichmakes provision of the service
more expensive thus discouraging passengers from using it.The increase in price, as the Advocate
General opined:
mayresult in a reduction in demand, to the disadvantage of the shippingcompany and the tour operator.
Thus, both persons who provide the services and the passengers as the persons for whom they are
intended are affected by the restriction.
Could the harbour dues be justified?
The ECJ ruled that it was unlawful to impose different harbour dues for domestic or intra-Commu-
nity traffic and traffic between a Member State and a third country, if that difference could not be
objectively justified.The imposition on passengers of vessels that call at, or whose final destination is,
a port in a third country with different harbour dues from those imposed on passenger of vessels
whose destination is domestic or in another Member State would be prohibited by the Regulation
where there is no correlation between that difference and the cost of the harbour services enjoyed
by such passengers. As far as the court was concerned, under the Regulation the imposition of
harbour dues for journeys to ports in third countries merely on the basis of the geographical
distances involved was not allowed. There is no true correlation between harbour dues and geo-
graphical distances ^ the imposition of harbour charges should be based on objective criteria, such
the objective difference in services offered by the carriers to passengers travelling from Rhodes to
different destinations.
The ruling from the ECJ demonstrates a reiteration of the general principle in free movement of
services and establishes that any derogation from these freedoms could only be permitted to the
extent they are proportionate to the aims to be achieved and justifiable on objective grounds. It
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seems quite obvious that the Rhodes harbour dues were imposed as a tourist tax and could not be
rationally justified on objective factors.
So what are the aims to be achieved and are they legitimate aims given the Greek government's EU
obligations? Where the aims are vital for the general or public interest, a measure which detracts
from the general remit of the Regulation but is defensible on such an ground could be vindicated. In
maritime transport services, it appears from JoinedCasesC-430/99 andC-431/99 Sea-LandServices
and Nedlloyd Lijnen (2002) that where the dues were to finance the costs of providing services
essential to themaintenance of public security at ports and harbours they could be said to serve the
general interest.
Once that is proved, the Member State seeking a derogation from its Regulation duties must
further show that there was in fact a correlation between the costs of the services from which
the user benefits and the amount of the dues he has to pay.The difficulty the Greek Government
had in the present case was that the structure of the harbour dues in Rhodes did not reveal such a
connection.Where such a connection is not seen, the presumption is that the charge or measure
was unlawful. Moreover, the Greek authorities could not demonstrate clearly the benefits to be
attained by the imposition of the harbour dues. The Greek tribunal, for example, had accepted
without demur that the harbour dues went towards meeting the costs of upkeep and port
improvement, port facilities and o`ther connected objectives relating to improving services to
passengers'. It is immediately obvious that such benefits have not been adequately identified or
described.What was even more questionable was the fact that some of the dues went to the
Merchant Seamen's Fund under Greek law.There was clearly no direct or proximate link between
such a payment andpassenger benefit.On thatbasis alone, theGreek law authorising the collection
of the different levels of harbour charges would be contrary to the Regulation and EUprinciples of
freedom of movement.
Finally, evenwhere there is a clear connection between themeasure and the aim to be achieved, the
Member State is thenrequired to demonstrate that themeasurewas notdisproportionate to the aim
as expressed.
In summary, the objective justification test borrowed from general principles of freedom of
movement and applied to the situations involvingmaritime transport services (Regulation 4055/86)
entails:
* first, identification of the aims to be achieved or general interests to be served;
* secondly, whether there is a genuine need for the aims or interests;
* thirdly, whether there is a genuine link between the measures in question (for example, the
harbour dues) and the aims or interests; and
* finally, if there is a genuine link, whether themeasures taken areproportionate or appropriate in
achieving those aims.
Conclusion
Harbour dues and port charges are coming under increasing scrutiny by the EU ^ whether the
intervention lies in the laws of competition or State Aid ( Joined Cases C-34/01and 38/01Enirisorse
SpA v Ministero delle Finanze (2003) (judgment pending from the ECJ)), or market access to port
services (the Proposal for a Directive on Market Access to Port Services (COM (2002) 0101 final)
(OJ 2002 C181 E, at 160) , or free movement of services (the present case). These developments,
although clearly welcome, are not entirely tension-free, as can be seen in the present case where
some Member States see protection of their ports and port interests as legitimate public interests
which could justify derogation from the provisions of general EU law (such as State Aid, competition
law, or in the present case, free movement of services) but they should be particularly aware that
such derogations although permitted are subject to very strict objective constraints.
156 JIML 9 [2003] 2 : EUROPEANUNION : INTERNATIONAL ANDREGIONALORGANISATIONS
Comment on the proposal to improve the Double Hull Regulation (Regulation 297/94)
On 20 December 2002 the Commission published a Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation
417/2002 on the accelerated phasing in of double hull or equivalent design requirements for single hull oil
tankers and repealing Council Regulation 2978/94 (COM (2002) 780 final). This move was entirely
motivated by the serious concerns following the sinking of the Prestige, a Bahamas-registered and
Liberian-owned 26-year-old single hull oil tanker, 270 km off the coast of Galicia in Spain on19 Nov-
ember 2002. Back in March 2002, the Council hadmade a Regulation (No 417/2002) introducing an
accelerated phasing-in scheme for the application of the double hull or equivalent design require-
ments of the MARPOL 73/78 Convention to single hull oil tankers. After the sinking of the Prestige,
the EUwas seriously concerned that the age limits for the operation of single hull oil tankers in that
Regulation were not sufficiently stringent and that certain grades of oil should only be carried by
double hull oil tankers.Hence, the swift proposal to amend Regulation 417/02.
There are three principal proposals in the amending legislation:
* heavy grades of oil should only be carried by double hull oil tankers;
* revision of the phasing-out scheme to ensure that single hull tankers of category 12 will not
operate beyond 23 years and 2005, or 28 years and 2010 for category 23 and 28 and 2015 for
category 3;4
* broader application of the special inspection regime for tankers designed to assess the structural
soundness of single hull tankers that aremore than15 years old.
`Heavy grades of oil' is defined in the amended Article 3 of Regulation 417/02 as `heavy fuel oil, heavy
crude oil, waste oils, bitumen and tar'. These oils are extremely polluting as they evaporate much
more slowly than lighter grades of oil and degrade only very slowly, thereby causing severe damage
to marine ecology. Article 1 of the Regulation is amended to empower Member States to b`an the
transport to or from ports5 of the Member States of heavy grades of oil in single hull oil tankers'. It
seems clear that this provision placesboth a right and a duty on theMember State concerned: a right
to prevent the carriage of heavy grades of oil to its territory, and a duty to prevent the carriage of
such oils to other countries. However, what is less obvious is first the test Member States are
required to apply in identifying the cargo of the single hulled vessel, in other words, the composition
of that duty of care, and secondly, to whom that duty is owed.
The new Article1(2)(b), if approved, would extend the scope of the Regulation to oil tankers of 600
tons dead-weight andover.This is to ensure that theban on the carriage of heavygrades of oil in single
hull tankers shall equally apply to small tankers of between 600 and 5,000 tons dead-weight.
Incidentally, it might also be noted that, in respect of ships on the EU's b`lacklist' (not necessarily
single hull tankers), Directive 95/21 on Port State Control allows a Port State to refuse access on
the basis of the type of vessel (for example, whether the ship is a chemical or gas tanker, a bulk
tanker, an oil tanker or a passenger ship), the flag, and the number of detentions in the preceding 24
or 36 months.6 The blacklist does not, however, form the legislative basis for refusal; Member States
still have to refer to their national legislation7 for that power.
2 Single hull crude oil tankers of 20,000 tons dead-weight and over, and single hull oil product carriers of 30,000 tons dead-weight and
over and having no segregated ballast tanks in protective locations, collectively known as pre-MARPOL single hull tankers (generally
constructed before1982).
3 Single hull oil tankers of the same size as category1but which are equippedwith segregated tanks in protective locations.
4 Single hull oil tankers below the size limits of categories1and 2 but above 5,000 tons dead-weight.
5 The Regulation is also being amended to extend coverage to a`nchorage areas' (see also Directive 95/21OJ L157, 7 July 1995, at 1, as
amended).
6 Article 7(b).
7 Which should conform to the requirements of the Port State Control Directive.
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Under the currentRegulation 417/02 single hull oil tankers are to bephased outby 2007 forCategory
1tankers and 2015 for Category 2 and Category 3 oil tankers.The Commission argues in its Proposal
that these age limits, although well within those recommended by the IMO,8 are not satisfactory,
particularly after the sinking of the Erika and the Prestige. Both vessels, it will be remembered, were
26-year-old Category1tankerswhen theybrokeup.The phasing-out scheme affects not only vessels
flying an EU flag but also theworld tanker fleet calling at EUports.
As far as the inspection system is concerned, Regulation 417/02 introduces a scheme known as the
Condition Assessment Scheme (`CAS') which is enforced and implemented by the Flag State and by
Classification Societies acting on their behalf.Under the scheme, inspections are carried out every
two and a half years specifically to detect structuralweaknesses of single hull tankers.Therule is that
single hull oil tankers of Category1andCategory 2whichhavenotreached their age limit should only
be allowed to continue operating beyond the cut-off date.9 The scheme does not currently apply to
Category 3 oil tankers but the Commission proposes that, as these ships are not entirely free of the
risk of pollution, the scheme should be extended to all remaining categories of single hull oil tankers
that aremore than15 years old. It should, however, benoted that thegeneral schemewould only take
placewith effect from2005, as an extensiveprogramme of inspection of thismagnitudewould clearly
place a severe strain on inspectors.
Theproposal is to be scrutinisedby the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of Regions,
the Council and the Parliament before it becomes law. It is anticipated that the final draft of the
proposal could be brought before theTransport Council10 on 27 March 2003.
The proposed changes are only a part of a bigger legislative framework ^ the EU has up until the
Prestige's incident adopted two packages of legislative measures, the Erika I11 and Erika II12 packages.
The former deals primarily with the tightening of Port State Control by amending the Directive on
Port State Control,13 the monitoring and supervision of Classification Societies14 and the setting in
motion of the programme to phase out single hull oil tankers.15 The latter establishes a European
Maritime Safety Agency16 which is charged with improving the enforcement of EUmaritime safety
rules. The package also proposes an information system to improve the monitoring of traffic in EU
waters17 and a legislative mechanism to enable victims of oil spills to claim compensation.18 These
measures are intended to work in tandem.These are interesting times for EUmaritime lawyers ^
there ismuchmanoeuvringbut it is rather sad that all this activity has come aboutonly after somuch
environmental damage had already been done.
8 See revised Regulation13 G, Annex I, MARPOLConvention.
9 2005 for tankers coming under Regulation 417/02 and 2010, under IMO legislation.
10 TheTransport Council is composed of Member Statesministers responsible for transport.
11 Tabled by the Commission in March 2000.
12 Tabled by the Commission in December 2000.
13 Directive 95/21/EC
14 By imposing strict prior authorisation requirements andmonitoring the Classification Societies in the performance of their duties.
15 Which culminated in themaking of Regulation 417/02 in March 2002.
16 The Maritime Safety Agency Regulation came into force in August 2002. Administrativemechanisms however are still being fleshed
out and are not due to be set in place until later in 2003.
17 The Directive on the Monitoring of MaritimeTraffic is due for implementation by Member States by February 2004.
18 Theproposalby the Commission for a regime to provide for compensation for oil spills victims has notbeen acceptedby theCouncil.
If accepted, theCommission's proposalwouldhave raised theupper limits on the amounts payable in the eventof a serious oil spill in EU
waters from the current ceiling of 200 million to 1billion.
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